On August 10, 1781 Livingston was selected for the most important post he held during the Revolution. Livingston was elected by a vote in Congress, over Arthur Lee, as Secretary for Foreign Affairs when the Articles of Confederation took effect. The job came with a salary of four thousand dollars per annum, which Livingston sorely needed to help make up his losses due to the war. He was a logical choice for an office that was similar to the modern post of Secretary of State. The prolific Chancellor read and spoke several languages. He was also a leading member of the Gallic party, those members of the congress who supported strengthening the French alliance.[i] When Livingston’s younger brother, Edward, replaced Martin Van Buren as Secretary of State in 1831 he wrote to his wife; “Here I am in the Second place in the United States – some say the first; in the place filled by Jefferson and Madison and Monroe and by him who filled it before any of them – my brother…”[ii]
The duties of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs were varied but the office’s actual power was limited when Livingston accepted the office on September 17, 1781. As with all the officers chosen under the Articles of Confederation, no real decision could be made without a debate and a vote in Congress. Livingston was allowed to attend sessions of Congress but needed permission to ask permission to speak, to ask questions even when his own department was being discussed or to see the papers and correspondence related to foreign affairs from before he took office. The Secretary’s main duty was to correspond with the states’ representatives in foreign countries, to keep congress updated as to their actions and to relay Congress’ instructions to the representatives. In addition, all correspondence from foreigners to Congress would be handled by his office. He was also responsible, unofficially, for keeping the French delegation in Philadelphia happy. This meant that his door was always open to them and that he would also be tasked with arranging receptions and other social functions for them.[iii]
The best example of what little regard Congress initially held their Secretary and how Livingston would be forced to fight for every ounce of respect he felt due to the office, he was once directed to put together a reception for the French delegation. When Livingston looked over the guest list that Congress provided he noticed that they had left off several important people, not the least of which was Livingston himself. Livingston replied to Congress that he would not demean himself by catering a party to which he was not even invited. Congress quickly conceded to his wishes and when the party was finally held not only did Livingston act as master of ceremonies for the night but he seated himself in a position of honor across from the president of Congress.[iv]
Livingston worked out of a small office near Independence Hall at 13 Sixth Street.
He had a small staff of secretaries; Lewis Morris, a soldier for whom Livingston had received a special furlough from George Washington, and Pierre Etene Du Ponceau.[v] They were later joined by a translator, Jean P. Tetard, who had most recently been employed teaching French to the Livingston family at Clermont.
During Livingston’s administration efforts were being made to bring other European powers into the war on the side of America. In addition to France and the Netherlands Livingston had hoped for an alliance with Russia. He wrote to Jay of ceding some of the Mississippi territory to “some northern power”, meaning Russia, to accomplish this. Fortunately Jay never made any offers of land concessions to any European powers and as the war progressed Livingston began to place more importance on land between the Mississippi River and Appalachian Mountains.[vi]
On his second day in office Livingston began his first letter to John Adams who was then in the Netherlands. He held the letter for a week, adding more information and was able to include the report of the surrender at Yorktown in the letter. He also included his opinion of the chances of bringing the Netherlands into the war on the side of the United States:
“The United Provinces appear to me one of those Governments, whose Very Constitution disposes them to peace. The ambition of making conquests either is, or ought to be, unknown to them. A War for the Extension of Commerce, is a solecism in Politicks, Since the shocks that the Established Trade sustains, infinitely Overbalances any new Accession that may be made by it. War, then, while the true Interest of the United Provinces is considered, will be the Child of Necessity. That necessity happily Exists at present, and will exist ‘till Great Britain Ceases to be the Tyrant of the Ocean. We are greatly interested in its continuance, But let us always bear in mind, that the moment Great Britain makes the Sacrifices which Prudence and Justice require, the United Provinces will be drawn by the interest of Commerce and the Love of Peace, to close with them.”[vii]
In other words, Livingston saw the Dutch as a tenuous ally at best, who would only side with the Americans or increase their aid to them if it was economically the best choice for them. The moment the war became monetarily detrimental the Dutch alliance would be gone.
To Jay, Livingston, wrote a private letter with his views on Adams;
“Let us know everything that passes in Holland. Our Minister there is Zealous and Laborious but I will not answer for his prudence. Truly his display of his public character, when every thing was against it cannot be accounted for on principles that will do him honor.”[viii] Livingston was referring to Adams’ attempt to gain official recognition from the Dutch that had been rebuffed.
Livingston’s view on the Netherlands had become even bleaker by the time he wrote to Adams again a month later. “I frankly confess that I have no hope that they will recognize us as an independent state…”[ix] To Franklin, the following February he wrote; “We have been extremely alarmed at some communications which the Minister of france made me from his Last Letters-They look extreamly as if the Ct De Vergennes imagined that neither Spain or Holland were anxious for our success…”[x] His letter to Adams also included a request that Adams explain why he presented his credentials to the States General before they were ready to receive him. Their refusal to accept them and Adams’ subsequent publication of a memorial in the newspapers were very humiliating to the young country. As much as Adams probably resented being scolded by Livingston, the Secretary’s suggestion that he consult more closely with the French representation in the Netherlands was probably the most galling part of the letter for someone who felt the French were taking too much control of the young country anyway and Livingston in particular. In September 1783 Adams wrote to his wife Abigail “Our late Minister of foreign affairs appears to have been a mere Puppet danced upon French Wires electrified from Passy.”[xi] In March of 1782 Livingston wrote to Adams again, having received three letters from Adams, and said “None of your letters take the least notice of the french Ambassador at the Hague, is there no intercourse between you? If not, to what is it to be attributed?”[xii] Adams had taken it upon himself to completely ignore Livingston’s request to bring the American mission in line with the French mission.
Perhaps because of his request that Adams consult with the French or simply because of his dislike for Livingston Adams’ correspondence with the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was spotty at best. On May 29, 1782 he wrote;
“It is with equal Surprise and concern that I find not the least attention paid to the several Letters I have written you since I have had the honor to be in Office. I attributed this to their not having reached you, till I saw an extract of a letter which I had written to Mr Dumas, and which went by the Same conveyance with one to you published in the Courier de l’Europe, from which circumstance I conclude it must have been received. It would give me pleasure to learn that I had been deceived in this particular-Because the punctuality with which your correspondence with Congress has hitherto been maintained would otherwise lead me to conclude that you were not satisfied with the present arrangement of the department for foreign affairs – a reflection which would be painful to me in proportion to the value I put upon your esteem.”[xiii]
This can be read in two ways; that Livingston was beginning to take Adams’ lack of communication personally or that Livingston did really care about Adams’ opinion of the job he was doing.
None of this made Adams any easier to deal with. On August 29, 1782 Livingston wrote to Adams again; “Near five months have elapsed since I have been favoured with a line from you.” He went on “Let me entreat you, Sir, to reflect on the disgrace and discredit it brings upon this department to be kept thus in the dark relative to matters of the utmost moment…”[xiv] Livingston could not carry out one of the basic functions of his job, to keep Congress aware of the state of affairs in Europe, if he did not have the information.
At least some of Adams’ lack of communication with Livingston seemed to stem from a long simmering hatred dating back to their earliest dealings with each other. It seems to have been rooted in Livingston’s social status. Adams actually held onto the hatred after Livingston had died. He wrote to Jefferson in “Have not Chancellor Livingston and Major General Humphreys introduced an hereditary aristocracy of Merino Sheep? How shall we get rid of the aristocracy? It is intailed upon us forever.” on September 15, 1813, more than six months after the Chancellor had died.[xv]
Livingston was also saddled with Francis Dana’s mission to Russia. Russia’s queen, Catherine the Great was a devout monarchist and was unlikely to provide any help to America break away from their own king, yet Dana was a constant drain on the budget as he attempted to make himself interesting enough to get an invitation to court. Dana never succeeded in gaining the court’s attention. It was not until 1809 that Russia would accept an American minister. When Livingston encouraged Dana to abandon the mission, Dana began referring to Livingston in his personal correspondence as “this Dutch Lawyer.”[xvi]
In January of 1782 Livingston wrote to General Nathaniel Greene about the bleak state of affairs that he had inherited.
“The British are again masters of the Ocean…We have no prospect of forming an Alliance either with Spain or Holland who both appear to sigh for Peace. Our Loan on the guarantee of France with the last, is nearly completed, but what is not a little unsatisfactory it is also nearly expended by the advances which France has made us on the credit of it. From Spain we are like to get nothing. The negotiations for a peace are entirely at a stand.”[xvii]
Later reports from England only added to the misery it was Livingston’s reluctant duty to spread. On April 16, 1782 Livingston wrote to Washington of General Cornwallis’s return to England following his defeat at Washington’s hands at Yorktown. Cornwallis was received “with the strongest marks of applause” and was later “carried from the London Tavern to Guidhall upon the shoulders of the populace.” Even more ominously Benedict Arnold was being asked to consult on how to conduct was in America which the British were “resolved to prosecute at all events…”[xviii]
In May of 1782 Livingston was able to head off a mission to Portugal that had the potential to have been as disastrous as the mission to Russia. He wrote a letter to Congress saying that their proposed mission to Lisbon, “may not be thought to promise advantages equivalent to the expence the United States will incur thereby, or the loss of reputation they may sustain if their solicitations should be rejected…”[xix] Congress took his advice and withheld sending an envoy until the situation was more promising.
Livingston’s correspondence with Benjamin Franklin in France was usually more civil and more frequent than his correspondence with Adams, although at times even Franklim had to be admonished to write more frequently. Livingston wrote;
“we were much surprized at not receiving a single line by the frigate which lately arrived at Chesapeake from any one of our foreign ministers it is upwards of three months since we have had a letter of intelligence form Europe. Congress complain of these neglects (for as such they consider them) & I flatter myself that in the future, as a channel is now open through this Office for regular correspondence, this cause of complaint will be removed & that Letters & papers will be lodged with our consuls to go by every conveyance.”[xx]
In August 1782 he wrote to Franklin again;
“We have not heard from you since March, a very long period, considering the interesting events that have taken place between that time and this-many vessels have arrived without bringing us a line from you- I am apprehensive that Mr Barclay does not communicate to you the frequent opportunities that offer of writing.”[xxi]
Later Livingston seemed to take out his frustration with all of his ministers in Europe on Franklin. He wrote;
“It is commonly said that Republics are better informed than monarchs of the State of their foreign Affairs, and that they insist upon a greater degree of vigilance and punctuality in their Ministers- We on the contrary seem to have adopted a new system, the ignorance in which we are kept of every interesting event renders it impossible for the Sovereign to instruct their servants, and of course forms them into an independent privy Council for the direction of their Affairs without their advise or concurrence…”
This is the perfect example of how Livingston was often frustrated with his subordinates and felt that they frequently left him unable to do half of his job, that of keeping Congress informed of the goings on in Europe, and perpetually embarrassed in front of other representatives. He went on;
“I can hardly express to you what I feel on this occasion, I blush when I meet a member of Congress who enquires into what is passing in Europe-When the General applies to me for advises on the same subject which must regulate his movements, I am compelled to inform him that we have no intelligence but what he has seen in Papers…”[xxii]
While secretary Livingston also took on one other employee, Thomas Paine, as a propagandist. The plan was the brain child of Robert Morris. Paine, author of Common Sense, was hired to help with the “Necessity of informing the People and rousing them into Action…” Livingston would supply Paine with information from foreign correspondence to use in his writing. Paine had formerly served as a secretary to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and had traveled to France with John Laurens to obtain a loan from France. On February 10, 1782 Livingston, Robert Morris and George Washington coauthored a letter to Congress asking to secretly put Paine on the payroll of the Foreign Affairs Department with a salary of $800. Congress approved and Paine began producing articles almost immediately.[xxiii]
Livingston was also responsible for correspondence with the Chevalier de la Luzerne, minister plenipotentiary of the French delegation. There is not a great deal of correspondence between the two as both men were frequently in Philadelphia at this time and were able to communicate face to face at almost any time. Some of their conversations were noted by James Madison but what he was basing his notes off of is unknown. Nonetheless there is some surviving correspondence between Livingston and Luzerne. On November 2, 1781 Livingston wrote to Luzerne to express the gratitude of Congress to the French for the victory at Yorktown. Included with an act of Congress Livingston included a letter in which he wrote; “It is with peculiar pleasure that I obey the directions of Congress in making communications which show their sense of the exertions of their ally and of the merit of the officers he employs.”[xxiv]
Livingston’s ability to write a flowery line, pleasing to the ear of a European courtesan, was yet another reason he was the ideal choice for Secretary of Foreign Affairs. America’s way of conducting diplomacy was sure to insult the sensibilities of the more experienced diplomats but Livingston was ideally situated to both smooth the ruffled feathers of the Europeans and explain to Congress what they had done wrong. In his response to the resolutions regarding Yorktown, Luzerne expressed displeasure that the United States was listed before France in all of the resolutions. Livingston replied;
“I am sorry to find that you consider the order in which allied nations or their sovereigns are placed in the resolutions as anywise exceptionable. This mode of expression might perhaps be justified by the absolute equality established between sovereign powers, and the common practice of independent nations to recognise no superior in acts to be executed by themselves within their own limits. But, sir, I am so well satisfied that Congress wish to avoid discussions which must be treated with great delicacy by nations situated as ours are, where every demand on the one part not strictly authorised by the law of nations might derogate from the generous protection which we make it our boast to have received, and the denial of just rights on the other subject us to imputation of ingratitude, that I think you may safely rely upon their practice, when some future occasion shall present, to evince that the order in which the allied nations are mentioned did not originate in any settled rule, and, above all, that no want of respect for his most Christian majesty dictated the resolution to which you object.”[xxv]
In a few lines Livingston had both apologized and excused the mistake and promised it would not happen again. He also subtly reminded Luzerne that they were separate and equal counties and, again subtly, made it apparent he did not appreciate being talked down to.
The following year Livingston was obliged to write his own admonishing letter to Luzerne after he failed to address Congress in the proper way. He wrote;
“the style of address to them should be in future, “Gentlemen of the Congress.” The undersigned hopes that the minister plenipotentiary of France will be pleased to make use of this form in the address which he proposes to make to Congress, as well as on every future occasion.”[xxvi]
1782 brought one of the first diplomatically embarrassing situations for the young county. Following the execution of an American militia soldier named Joshua Huddy, by loyalists, George Washington chose a British prisoner of war, Charles Asgill, who had been captured at Yorktown, for execution as retribution. Livingston knew that Washington’s actions would raise questions among the European courts, as they technically violated the terms of the British army’s surrender. Livingston wished to be armed with all the information he could possibly have when the questions from foreign powers inevitably started coming in, as they would be his responsibility to answer. Congress freed Asgill in December. Livingston wrote to Washington;
“The affair of Huddy will make some noise in Europe that I may be prepared to meet every misrepresentation there I wish to be informed by your excellency of steps the enemy take in that business & every occurrence that may thro light upon this interesting event…”[xxvii]
Interestingly Washington did not put a response to this letter on paper, but simply sent Livingston a note saying the General Lincoln was on his way to Philadelphia to tell Livingston all he needed to know of the affair. Livingston himself was not opposed to Washington’s actions, he wrote; “It is a melancholy case but the repeated cruelties of the British has rendered some retaliation absolutely necessary how much soever they may hurt our feelings.”[xxviii]
The task of trying to secure payments for American privateers who brought prizes into foreign ports often fell to Livingston although he was “at a loss to determine upon what principle” the disputes were sent to his office.[xxix] The most famous case that Livingston was involved in was that of John Paul Jones of the U.S.S Bonhomme Richard and his prize, the H.M.S. Serapis. On September 23, 1779 Jones captured the British 50-gun frigate Serapis while in command of the 42- gun Bonhomme Richard and a small fleet of other vessels under the American flag at the Battle of Flamborough.Head. The Bonhomme Richard suffered such extensive damage during the fight that she sank shortly after Jones and his crew boarded the Serapis. They soon sailed it to a safe port expecting their prize money. Three years later, in 1782, the crew of the Bonhomme Richard andthe other American ships had not yet received any prize money for their captures and so petitioned Congress for help.[xxx] Congress passed the issue on to Livingston, most likely because they felt French help would be needed to resolve the matter. Livingston spent months working on the matter but was not able to resolve the issue in part because of a concordant entered into by the captains of the fleet before they engaged in the fight. Ultimately the prize money would not be paid out until 1848 to the descendants of the sailors that engaged in the fight.[xxxi]
Within months of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, John Jay and the other foreign ministers receiving word of the surrender of the British Army under Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown negotiations began for a peace with Great Britain. As Livingston put it; “The British are at length sufficiently humbled to sue for peace…”[xxxii] Livingston maintained a steady stream of correspondence to the negotiators to keep them as informed as possible as to the situation in America. On January 9, 1782 he wrote to John Adams; “Many of the tories in North Carolina, enraged at being deserted, have joined our army, and, as is said, executed some of their leaders. The enemy have drawn all their troops into Charleston…”[xxxiii]
This letter is also interesting in that Livingston lays out how he feels about the English after nearly seven years of war in the form of comparing the two countries. He wrote:
“The one fighting to oppress and enslave a free people, the other to establish their rights; the one attempting to tyrannize over the ocean, and fetter the commerce of the world, the other resisting that tyranny, and rendering trade as free as nature made it; the one insulting, plundering and abusing an old friend, an ally, in the midst of profound peace, the other extending in war mercy to their bitterest enemies, and marching to conquest with domestic peace in their train; the one burning defenseless towns and peaceful villages, where they have been hospitably entertained, the other guarding from violence with scrupulous attention the firesides of their inveterate foes; the one murdering in cold blood, or more cruelly by want and misery in prison ships, those who speak the same language, profess the same religion and spring from the same ancestors; the other forgetting difference of religion, language and hereditary enmity, spare the vanquished, administer to their wants, offer consolation to their distress, and prove more by their conduct than by their professions, that they are armed in the cause of humanity.”[xxxiv]
Although Livingston had long been a proponent of separation with England, this letter shows the true animosity he had developed toward the British during the course of the war. Of course having his house and family estate burned to the ground and seeing family members wounded and killed in service to the United States completely justify the animosity he felt toward the British. As he concluded his letter to Adams “they are no longer the people we once thought them; if ever they were brave and generous, they have lost those virtues with the spirit of freedom.”[xxxv] In truth the most surprising thing about this letter is that it is written to John Adams, a man Livingston rarely got along with. Livingston was using a touch of openness and honesty to spur a political enemy on to the common goal they both sought.
Franklin, Adams and John Jay were sent to Paris to carry out the negotiations. For Jay permission to leave Spain in May of 1782 to head to Paris and begin negotiations was a treat. Spain had never officially acknowledged him as a minister and made unreasonable demands in return for minimal cooperation from them. Livingston had actually encouraged him to leave Spain in 1781; “GO TO PARIS IF NO LOANS CAN BE OBTAINED, IF NO TREATY CAN BE OPENED, WHY STAY WHERE YOU [are] AND EXPERIENCE NOTHNG BUT MORTIFICATION.”[xxxvi] The willingness to negotiate an actual peace treaty a shift, in Livingston’s eyes, from the British empire’s previous position of bringing the colonies back into the fold one way or the other. Offers had been made to mediate the differences between the British “and what they call their rebel Subjects. They persist on every occasion in representing us a divided People, who anxiously wish to return to our connection with England.”[xxxvii]
In 1782 the peace commissioners were able to agree in principal to terms with Great Britain. The most important clause, of course, recognized the thirteen states as independent from Great Britain. The treaty also gave the new country fishing rights to the banks of Newfoundland, granted equal rights to both countries in the Mississippi and called for the removal of British troops from the country without plundering or damaging property. The treaty also gave loyalists who had not fought against the United States the right to seek compensation for property confiscated from them and protected them from future retribution. There was also a secret article that dealt with the border of West Florida depending on how Britain and Spain settled their territories when their treaties were signed.
Livingston took exception with how the commissioners went about handling the negotiations. They negotiated in secret without the advice of any of America’s allies, particularly France. Livingston actually broke procedure and wrote to the commissioners without the permission of congress to scold them. He wrote:
“But, Gentlemen, tho’ the issue of your Treaty has been successful, tho’ I am satisfied that we are much indebted to your firmness and perseverance, to your accurate knowledge of our situation, and of our wants for this success; yet I feel no little pain at the distrust manifested in the management of it, particularly in signing the Treaty without communicating it to the Court of Versailles ‘till after the Signature, and in concealing the separate Article from it ever when signed. I have examined with the most minute attention all the reasons assigned in your several Letters to justify these Suspicions. I confess they do not appear to strike me so forcibly as they have done you, and it gives me pain that the Character of Candour and Fidelity to its Engagements, which should always characterize a great People should have been impeached thereby. The concealment was in my opinion absolutely unnecessary. For had the Court of France disapproved the terms you had made after they had been agreed upon, they could not have acted so absurdly as to counteract you at that late day, and thereby have put themselves in the power of an Enemy, who would certainly betray them, and perhaps justify you in making terms for yourselves.”[xxxviii]
Livingston believed that by making peace without the advice of the French the commissioners had not only put the reputation of the country on the line but had also put the alliance with France in jeopardy. France had little choice but to follow along with the treaty even though the treaty had a very real possibility of putting the French at a disadvantage to England by granting the English more than the French were willing to give. This could have resulted in the French abandoning their alliance with the States and seeking a separate peace with Great Britain or worse, decide on their own military retribution against America.
This drew a lengthy response from Jay, in defense of the treaty, with a point by point refutation of Livingston’s criticism of the draft of the articles. He wrote;
“we regret that the Manner in which the Business was conducted, does not coincide with your Ideas of Propriety. We are persuaded however that this is principally owing to your being necessarily unacquainted with a Number of Circumstances, known to us who are on the spot…”
He went on, most eloquently, on Livingston’s accusation that they had endangered the alliance with France by being untruthful;
“We perfectly concur with you in Sentiment, Sir, “that honesty is the best policy” but until it be shown that we have trespassed on the Rights of any Man or Body of men, you must excuse our thinking that this Remark as applied to our Proceedings was unnecessary.
Should any Explanations either with France or Spain become necessary on this Subject, we hope and expect to meet with no Embarrassments. We shall neither amuse them nor perplex ourselves with ostensible and flimsy Excuses, but tell them plainly that as it was not our Duty to give them Information, we considered ourselves at Liberty to withhold it, and we shall remind the French Minister that he has more Reason to be pleased than displeased with our Silence. Since we have assumed a place in the Political System of the World let us move like a Primary and not like a Secondary Planet.” [xxxix]
This of course would have done nothing to allay Livingston’s concerns, and annoyed him further, as he had been writing to the commissioners looking for information for months. It should be noted that Livingston’s disapproval of the treaty was personal and not from Congress which approved the treaty as rapidly as it could. This was amongst the earliest cracks in the relationship between Livingston and Jay that would ultimately see the dearest of friends separated so severely by political issues that they did not speak for years before the Chancellor’s death.
With the peace treaty signed Livingston was placed in the interesting position of trying to stop the war that he had helped start. With treaties being signed thousands of miles away from where the fighting was happening, it took months for word of peace to trickle down to the actual combatants, particularly in regards to ships at sea which often went long stretches of time without seeing another vessel. Sir Guy Carleton, commanding British forces in Canada, sensibly would not take the Americans’ word that the war was over and awaited a dispatch from England telling him to cease hostilities. In an attempt to stop the fighting Livingston forwarded Carleton dispatches from a ship that arrived from Cadiz, Spain on March 24 1783, as well as copies of orders from Congress to stop fighting. He wrote;
“Though this may not be considered by your excellency as official, yet your humanity will induce you to think it sufficiently authentic to justify your taking immediate measures to stop the further effusion of bloody on which principle Congress have been pleased to pass the enclosed resolution”[xl]
At the same time he wrote to George Washington with news of the peace and his assessment of it; “You will by this express receive the agreeable intelligence of a peace, upon which I most sincerely congratulate you and the army…the Bahama Islands are ceded to the British. Holland seems to have come worst off, and France, by getting little for herself, has laid in a store of reputation which will be worth more than much territory.”[xli]
It was two weeks later that Livingston finally received the word he was anxiously awaiting. A packet ship from England has arrived in New York City bearing official word that the treaty had been signed. Better still it contained an order from the King calling for a cessation of hostilities. The war was over, although Carleton would drag his feet on departing, not infoming Washington of a plan to depart until November.[xlii] Livingston had always felt that the treaty left the departure date of the British far too nebulous or as he put it “The 7th Article leaves the time for the evacuation of New York upon so loose a footing, that I fear our troublesome Guests will long continue…”[xliii]
The troublesome 7th article of the treaty which stated that the British would leave the former colonies, although it gave no date for the departure. It also stated that the British would depart without destroying or taking any property from Americans. At one point Guy Carleton wrote to Livingston reminding of the treaty’s clause about restoring the property of loyalists. Livingston’s response focused on New York City;
“It must be obvious that a recommendation to restore the Loyalists the estates they have forfeited will come with less weight before legislatures composed of men whose property is still withheld from them by the continuance of armies and fleets in this country then it will do when peace and the full enjoyment of their rights shall have worn down those asperities which have grown out of eight years’ war.”[xliv]
Livingston was not the man to write to about this clause. His country seat with most of its outbuildings and a great deal of his personal property had been burned to ashes by the British army and his New York City residence and its contents had been seized by the British in 1776. He would see no recompense from them. As much as Livingston had fought against the unwarranted seizing of loyalist property during the war, the British general responsible for separating Livingston from so much of his property was unlikely to find an ally in him to aid loyalists in retaining their property.
When Guy Carleton and George Washington met to discuss the end of hostilities and the British leaving New York on May 6, 1783, Carleton mentioned that he was allowing slaves who had escaped from their masters and come into New York to depart on British ships because they had been promised freedom by proclamations of various British generals. Upon hearing this Livingston wrote to the peace commissioners hoping they could have this redressed in the formal treaty:
“Nothing can be more a direct violation of the 7th Article of the Provisional Treaty, than sending off the Slaves, under the pretence that their Proclamation had set them free, as if a British General had, either by their laws or those of nations, a right by Proclamation to deprive any man whatever of property: they may with much more propriety pretend to re-establish every of their Adherents in all the Rights they had before the war, since they have engaged to do so, and the People, with whom they made these engagements, were capable of entering into them, which Slaves were not-or even, if they were, the promise made to them must be under the same limitations with those made to their other Adherents in this Country, & amounts to nothing more than this, make yourselves Free, and we will protect you in that freedom as long as we can. The Articles imply that they were no longer able to protect them.”[xlv]
For Livingston this was an issue of property. The very reason he had turned rebel was to prevent government from taking property. Suddenly, what was now a foreign government was taking the property of people of his state. He saw this as the British trying to maintain control over the country that they had lost. Livingston said, in essence, that British promises to any one in New York no longer meant anything because they had lost the war.
Of course in his defense of property rights Livingston was also defending the rights of slave holders. Livingston was himself a slave owner, as were most others of his class in New York. On the 1790 census Livingston owned nine people, 1800 he owned twelve, and in 1810 five. Livingston’s enslaved people seem to have been mostly used as house servants. One visitor, to the Chancellor’s rebuilt house, William Strickland, noted during a breakfast in 1794: “Four negro boys, the eldest about 11 or 12, the youngest about 5 or 6 years old., clean and well dressed but bare-footed, in a livery of green turned up with red waited about the table.”[xlvi] Another visitor, Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, noted a few years later that “For servants he has 4 negroes and 4 negresses.”[xlvii] Yet Livingston was also an early member of the New York Manumission Society. In what seemed to be a callous move he, and the Committee of Revision, vetoed a bill in 1799 that would have emancipated the enslaved people in the state. However the Committee vetoed the bill because it did not grant those enslaved people any civil rights and would have created a population of people who were free but with no ability to make anything of that freedom. Livingston was, like many of the other founders including Washington and Jefferson, ambivalent about slavery.[xlviii]
When the British finally did evacuate New York City in November of 1783, Livingston was among the first Americans to reenter the city after George Washington and his army. After five days he wrote to Jay with a sense of astonishment as to how the city was enduring the change in administration and also a bit of humor.
“Our enemies are hardly more astonished then we ourselves and than you will [be] when you hear that we have been five days in town without the smallest disturbance, that the most obnoxious Royalists that had sufficient confidence in our clemency to them have not met with the least insult. Their shops were opened the day after we came in, and Rivington himself goes as usual. His State of New York gazette is as well received as if he had never been printer to the Kings most excellent majesty. So that your friends in Europe will find their apprehensions ill founded, and that the race of Tories will not after all be extinct in America. Perhaps with good training, and by crossing the breed frequently (as they are very tame) they may be rendered useful animals in a few generations.”[xlix]
Livingston was highly successful during his time in office as Secretary of Foreign Affairs. A September 1782 report found that he had written at least seventy three letters on the behalf of Congress to ministers and consuls overseas, foreign representatives and state governments between taking on the office in late 1781 and July 1782 when the inquiry into the office was carried out. The report found that; “Upon the whole the Committee report that the business of this Department appears to have been conducted with much industry, attention and utility; and without any errors or defects worthy of being taken notice of to Congress.”[l] Livingston attempted to resign the office at least twice but was asked to continue until a suitable replacement could be found. In November of 1782 Livingston met with James Madison to discuss the possibility of resigning because he “ultimately decided to prefer his place of Chancellor of N. York” and hoped that Thomas Jefferson would replace him.[li] He officially made his first attempt to resign on December 3, 1782 but agreed to stay in office until he was replaced. On December 21 a committee consisting of James Madison, John Rutledge and John Taylor Gilman reported that they had convinced Livingston to remain in office until May of 1783.[lii] In May the committee returned to Livingston to ask him to continue in his office again, but he replied “It is my wish to endeavor to repair the injuries my Estate has sustained by the Ravages of the Enemy, my own neglect, and the offices I have held.”[liii] On June 4, 1783 he was finally able to begin preparing to leave Philadelphia for home. Congress thanked him before he departed;
“That the thanks of Congress be presented to Mr. Livingston for his services during his continuance in office; and that he be assured Congress entertain a high sense of the ability, zeal and fidelity with which he hath discharged the important trust reposed in him.”[liv]
Charles Thomson wrote to Livingston; “I am extremely sorry to find the public must be deprived of the benefits of your experience & services at the very time when I apprehend they will be most wanted.” He went on to request that Livingston organize, pack and seal his official papers, as Congress had required Thomson take charge of the papers but he would not be performing any of the duties of the office.[lv] It was months before anyone would take the time to open the boxes to examine the documents. In the meantime Livingston offered to sign the final treaty as sort of a Secretary for Foreign Affairs emeritus because no new secretary had yet been appointed. Congress did not feel this was necessary and did not take him up on the offer.[lvi]
The importance of Livingston’s tenure as Secretary for Foreign Affairs cannot be overstated. He built up a functioning office from nothing. He was deeply involved with Secretary for Finance Robert Morris in keeping the country solvent. He strove to organize the efforts of diplomatic missions scattered across Europe into a cohesive effort rather than mess of conflicting messages and promises that the new country could not keep. By the time he stepped down there was a steady and organized flow of information from foreign delegations and the Congress. In addition he nursed the young country’s most important alliance that with France, through some sticky situations where the wrong word from a more brash man could have severed the alliance. At the same time he made sure that France understood they were a separate and independent country that would not be subject to them or to suffer diplomatic slights from them, again while maintaining the all-important alliance. In this way he helped to establish the international identity that the United States would take forward after the war was over.
[i] Journals of the Continental Congress Volume XIX p. 64-65, Journals of the Continental Congress Volume XXI p 851-852.
[ii] Quoted in Hunt, Charles Haven Life of Edward Livingston p 361
[iii]Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume XXI p 1028, Bemis, Samuel Flagg The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1927 p123, 125-126.
[iv] Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 129.
[v] Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 p 120. After having his furlough extended in August of 1782 Morris resigned from the army in December of 1782.
[vi] Morris, Richard B. The Peacemakers: The Great Powers and American Independence Harper & Row Publishers, New York 1965 p 247.
[vii] Robert R. Livingston to John Adams October 23, 1781 Papers of John Adams Volume 12 MHS
[viii] Robert R. Livingston to John Jay October 20, 1781 in Morris, Richard B. John Jay: Winning the Peace Unpublished Papers 1780-1784 Harper and Rowe, New York 1980 p 114.
[ix] Robert R. Livingston to John Adams November 20, 1781 Papers of John Adams Volume 12 MHS
[x] “To Benjamin Franklin from Robert R. Livingston, 13 February 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-36-02-0401. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 36, November 1, 1781, through March 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 569–572.]
[xi] “John Adams to Abigail Adams, 1 September 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-05-02-0129. [Original source: The Adams Papers, Adams Family Correspondence, vol. 5, October 1782 – November 1784, ed. Richard Alan Ryerson. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 231–233.]
[xii] Robert R. Livingston to John Adams March 5, 1782 Papers of John Adams Volume 12 MHS
[xiii] Robert R. Livingston to John Adams May 29, 1782 Papers of John Adams Volume 13 MHS
[xiv] Robert R. Livingston to John Adams 29 August 1782 Papers of John Adams Volume 13 MHS
[xv] John Adams to Thomas Jefferson September 15, 1813 in Capon, Lester J Ed. The Adams Jefferson Letters: The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill 19 59 p 375-377.
[xvi] Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 164-168.
[xvii] Robert R. Livingston to General Green 31 January 1782 Collection of Clermont State Historic Site.
[xviii] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 16 April 1782” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08177 [last update: 2016-03-28]) Source: The George Washington Papers.
[xix] Journals of the Continental Congress, Volume XXII p249-250.
[xx] “To Benjamin Franklin from Robert R. Livingston, 23 January 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-36-02-0324. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 36, November 1, 1781, through March 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2001, pp. 468–469.]
[xxi] “To Benjamin Franklin from Robert R. Livingston, 9 August 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-37-02-0475. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, pp. 717–719.]
[xxii] “To Benjamin Franklin from Robert R. Livingston, 5 September 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-38-02-0056. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 38, August 16, 1782, through January 20, 1783, ed. Ellen R. Cohn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006, pp. 68–73.]
[xxiii] Robert Morris, Robert R. Livingston and George Washington to Congress February 10, 1782 Founders Online, Rappleye, Charles Robert Morris: Financier of the American Revolution Simon & Schuster, New York 2010 p 296.
[xxiv] Robert R. Livingston to Luzerne November 2, 1781 RDC Volume 4
[xxv] Robert R. Livingston to Luzerne November 6, 1781 RDC Volume 4 p 832-833.
[xxvi] Robert R. Livingston to Luzerne May 12, 1782 RDC Volume 5
[xxvii] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 12 June 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08673.
[xxviii] “To Benjamin Franklin from Robert R. Livingston, 30 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-37-02-0266. [Original source: The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, vol. 37, March 16 through August 15, 1782, ed. Ellen R. Cohn. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003, pp. 428–433.]
[xxix] Robert R. Livingston to the President of Congress February 26, 1782 The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence Volume 5 p 202-203.
[xxx] Interestingly, in addition to members of the Bonhomme Richard’s crew the other petioners came mainly from the USS Alliance captained by Pierre Landais, whose chief contribution to the battle was firing into both the Bonhomme Richard and the Serapis, causing as much damage to the American ship as they did to the British ship.
[xxxi] Robert R. Livingston to the President of Congress February 26, 1782 The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence Volume 5 p 202-203, Robert R. Livingston to John Paul Jones April 17, 1782 The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence Volume 5 p 313, Thomas, Evans John Paul Jones: Sailor, Hero, Father of the American Navy Simon and Schuster, New York 2003 p 213.
[xxxii] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 27 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08535.
[xxxiii] Letter to John Adams, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1830 www.bartleby.com/400/prose/527.html accessed 11/13/17
[xxxiv] Letter to John Adams, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1830 www.bartleby.com/400/prose/527.html accessed 11/13/17
[xxxv] Letter to John Adams, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution, 1830 www.bartleby.com/400/prose/527.html accessed 11/13/17
[xxxvi] Robert R. Livingston to John Jay November 28, 1781 in Morris, Richard B. John Jay: Winning the Peace p117-118.
[xxxvii] Robert R. Livingston to George Clinton May 2, 1782 Public Papers of George Clinton Volume VIII p 3
[xxxviii] Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners March 25, 1783 Papers of John Adams Vol. 14 MHS
[xxxix] John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and John Jay to Robert R. Livingston July 18, 1783 in Morris, Richard B. John Jay: Winning the Peace p554-556.
[xl]Robert R. Livingston to Sir Guy Carleton March 24, 1783 RDC Volume 6 p 337
[xli] Robert R. Livingston to George Washington March 24, 1783 RDC Volume 6 p 337
[xlii] Livingston included a copy of the letter Carleton sent him with this information in a letter to Washington on April 15, 1783 see “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 15 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-11068
[xliii] “Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 21 April 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0269. [Original source: The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 14, October 1782–May 1783, ed. Gregg L. Lint, C. James Taylor, Hobson Woodward, Margaret A. Hogan, Mary T. Claffey, Sara B. Sikes, and Judith S. Graham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 435–438.]
[xliv] Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 p 134.
[xlv] “Robert R. Livingston to the American Peace Commissioners, 28 May 1783,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-14-02-0317. [Original source: The Adams Papers, Papers of John Adams, vol. 14, October 1782–May 1783, ed. Gregg L. Lint, C. James Taylor, Hobson Woodward, Margaret A. Hogan, Mary T. Claffey, Sara B. Sikes, and Judith S. Graham. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008, pp. 503–504.]
[xlvi] Census data from Kelley, Arthur C.M. Settlers and Residents Volume 2 Part 2 Town of Clermont 1790-1875 Kinship Press, New York 1975 p 1,5, 12., Strickland, William Journal of a Tour in the United States of America 1794-1795 The New York Historical Society, New York 1971 p.119.
[xlvii] Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn Under Their Vine and Fig Tree: Travels Through America in 1797-1799, 1805 with Some Further Account of Life in New Jersey The Grassman Publishing Company, New Jersey 1965. p 195.
[xlviii] Stahr John Jay 237.
[xlix] Robert R. Livingston to John Jay November 29, 1783 in Morris, Richard B. John Jay: Winning the Peace p 653. This letter also seems to indicate that Livingston was unaware of James Rivington’s role in supplying intelligence to George Washington.
[l] “Report on Secretary for Foreign Affairs, [18 September] 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-05-02-0058. [Original source: The Papers of James Madison, vol. 5, 1 August 1782 – 31 December 1782, ed. William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 132–137.]
[li] “Notes on Debates, 28 November 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-05-02-0144. [Original source: The Papers of James Madison, vol. 5, 1 August 1782 – 31 December 1782, ed. William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967, pp. 337–338.]
[lii] Journals of the Continental Congress Volume XXIII p759, 823-824.
[liii] Journals of the Continental Congress Volume XXIV p 336.
[liv] Journals of the Continental Congress Volume XXIV p 382.
[lv] Charles Thomson to Robert R. Livingston June 4, 1783 LDC Volume 20 p 307.
[lvi] Bemis, The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy Vol 1 p 183.
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