From the early days of the war Livingston made himself vital to the planning and execution of the defenses of the Hudson River. He was also important on a national level with shaping how the army would conduct the war. In October of 1775 when Congress was debating the disposition of troops, Roger Sherman said “New York has the best militia upon the continent.” to which Livingston quickly replied “They will be necessary at the Highlands.”[i] He was a welcome correspondent to many of the most senior officers in the Continental Army. Almost all seemed to appreciate his advice and at least take his opinions under advisement. He served on many committees on both the state and local level that dealt with the army and the defenses of the nation.
Robert R. Livingston never served in any organized military units although he had been named lieutenant colonel of the Livingston Manor militia regiment, which covered Livingston Manor, Clermont and Germantown and was commanded by his cousin Peter R. Livingston of the Manor, in 1775. He never served in the field with the regiment as he was too busy with political affairs. His duties devolved onto the regiments major, his cousin Henry Livingston, son of Robert Livingston, 3rd Lord of Livingston Manor. In 1778 when the militia regiment was reorganized Henry officially took over the Chancellor’s rank and position as lieutenant colonel of the regiment. Despite his lack of actual field service Robert was able to provide cogent military advice to authorities within the state and also to George Washington and other officers of the Continental Army. He frequently corresponded with General Washington in both an official capacity because of his various committee roles and unofficially as a welcome advisor. Washington showed a willingness to move on Livingston’s advice nearly days as soon as he arrived in New York when on July 14, 1776 he wrote to John Hancock;
“by advice of R.R. Livingston Esqr, and other Gentn. I dispatched expresses to Genl Clinton of Ulster and Committee of Safety for Dutchess County, to take measures for securing the passes in the Highlands, lest they might have designs of Seizing them and have a force concealed for the purpose.”[ii]
During the battle of New York Livingston was not shy about offering advice to Washington, especially after Washington wrote to him encouraging Livingston to continue his advice. Livingston encouraged the abandonment of Fort Washington and the removal of its supplies to a more secure location long before the fort fell to the British. Washington did not heed Livingston’s advice and the fort fell to the British in November of 1776, costing Washington about a quarter of his army and supplies.[iii]
Livingston made recommendations about posts, the use of troops and possible moves that the British might take. On August 9, 1776 he wrote to Washington on all of these matters.
“I early foresaw what has since hapnd, & therefore made it my endevour to enforce the drawing out as much of the strength of this State as could possibly be collected. I can not but hope that the good effect of this measure will very shortly appear A considerable body of troops will as we suppose begin there march for the kings bridge tomorrow, and I flatter myself that in five or six days their number will be increased to sixteen or eighteen hundred men. Such is my Idea of the importance of this post that I could wish your Excellency to count as little as possible upon the raw troops we send there, but to send thither all you originally design’d for that station. Your Excellency is best able to judge whether it can be rendered tenable without some cannon, Gunners & Matrosses, & how far it is prudent to supply the want under which it now labours by sending them from some other place.
Since I am upon this subject I will take the liberty to hint what may possibly have escaped your Excellencys attention in the multiplicity of business in which you are involved. I mean the possibility of the enemies destroying the bridge (if their fleer shd get above the town) by means of a body of troops sent up the creek in boats, before any Assistance could come in, unless some small work was thrown up for its defence, which the situation renders very practicable.”[iv]
In those few lines Livingston reported to Washington the situation of the militia at King’s Bridge, how they thought they should be reinforced and what he thought the British might do next, all without risking offending Washington by addressing him only in the most flattering of terms.
Livingston was, of course, not the only civilian writing to Washington with advice on how to conduct the war. What made Livingston’s letters to Washington different was that they were welcome. Washington wrote a quick note to Livingston in October of 1776, after he had received quite a bit of advice from Livingston, “the extreme hurry in which I have been Involved for these Eight days, will only allow me time to acknowledge the receipt of yr favour, and to thank you (as I shall always do) for Any hints you may please to communicate, as I have great reliance upon your judgement; & knowledge of the Country…”[v] In 1780 Washington reiterated to Livingston how much he valued his letters; “the opinion, & advice of my friends, I receive at all times as proof of their friendships, and am thankful when they are offered.”[vi]
It is a mystery how Livingston acquired his military knowledge. The most likely scenario is that Livingston gained his knowledge of military arts in the same way that Henry Knox and Nathaniel Greene had learned; by reading. Livingston was an avid reader whose personal library at the time of his death consisted of approximately 5000 volumes. What is not known is the full extent of what books were in his library before the war as most of them were stolen or destroyed by the British in New York City or burned in his home at Clermont in 1777.
Before his assignment to the previously mentioned Committee to the Northward, which consulted on the early defenses of the river before heading north in an attempt to reach the northern army in Canada Livingston had been chosen by Congress on October, 6 1775 to sit on a committee to consider a letter from New York about the fortifications along the Hudson River. The other members of the committee were John Morton and Silas Deane. The committee reported back to Congress on October 7 with a list of recommendations for the river’s defense. They recommended that Congress direct the New York provincial convention to make the river defensible with particular attention to fortifications that could be completed before winter set in. Additional batteries should be installed to harass the enemy, a system of signals should be developed to warn of an invasion and steps should be taken to make the navigation of the river difficult. Eventually all of these recommendations would be included in the river’s defenses.[vii]
On July 17, 1776 Livingston was chosen for a Secret Committee by the New York convention to “form & execute any plan which we may conceive necessary for the defence of Hudson’s River…” The other members included Robert Yates, Gilbert Livingston, Christopher Tappaen and William Paulding.[viii] The committee got to work immediately and the very next day they reported to Washington on the state of Forts Montgomery and Constitution, which had been begun in earnest in May of that year. Writing to Washington from Fort Montgomery, the Committee found the forts lacking, to say the least; “we are extremely sorry to say that notwithstanding the importance & advantageous situation they are by no means in a proper posture of Defence…” The forts lacked cannon and howitzers, the actual fortifications were incomplete and in need of the attention of an engineer, and most importantly they lacked men, “we cannot think the Garrisons by any means, proportioned to the Extent of the Works or the importance of the Place…”[ix] Livingston was soon chosen to be the liaison between the committee and General George Washington since their defensive plans would serve to backstop Washington’s army near New York. Livingston would frequently write to Washington and visit his headquarters.[x]
One of the first strategies that this committee came up with was the use of fire ships literally just ships pointed at the enemy, lit on fire and allowed to drift, to deter British ships on the river. Fire was the worst enemy of the wooden warship. In addition to the wood itself the ship was covered in various flammable materials such as the large cloth sails, tarred ropes and paints. Even a small fire could spread quickly and if it reached the ship’s magazine which contained hundreds if not thousands of pounds of gun powder there would be no saving the ship or most of those on her. A few English fire ships had thrown the Spanish Armada into confusion in 1588 and saved England. The committee hoped their ships would have the same effect on the British navy in New York Harbor. The committee decided to buy existing ships from along the river to be used as fire ships against the British with Robert R. Livingston responsible for procuring three sloops, filling them with combustibles such as pitch, tar and turpentine and sending them to Poughkeepsie. The fire ships were used in an unsuccessful attack on the British ships Phoenix, Rose and an accompanying bomb ketch,which had sailed up the river as far as Yonkers in late July. The bomb ketch was consumed by fire but the two larger ships managed to escape with only minor damage.[xi]
Eventually the committee decided to prevent the British from ascending the river with a series of forts and semi-permanent emplacements in and along the river. The first would be a set of chevaux de Frise. These were essentially large, iron tipped wooden spikes anchored into stone beds on the river bottom to make them difficult to move. It was thought British ships sailing north would impale themselves on the spikes and sink. Upstream from these would be a large chain that would make it impossible for ship to sail on.
The first chain across the river was almost an exclusively a Livingston production. The iron was produced at the Ancram iron works which belonged to Robert Livingston, the Third Lord of Livingston Manor. Opened around 1742 by his father Philip Livingston, Second Lord of Livingston Manor, the Ancram iron works were the first successful iron works in the colony of New York. During the war they produced everything from stoves to ammunition for the war effort. They even attempted to make cannon at Ancram but the furnaces were not large enough to produce cannon on the scale needed by the war effort. For the chain the iron works produced bar, an inch and a half square, that was then transported across the Manor to the river. It was actually shaped into links by blacksmiths at Fishkill. Wood for the rafts used to keep the chain near the surface of the water was provided by John Livingston. The chain was then strung between Fort Montgomery and Anthony’s Nose, a mountain across the river from the fort in northern Westchester County.[xii]
During the fall of 1776, Livingston was also involved in efforts to disrupt loyalist activities in the Hudson River Valley. John Jay was known to be involved in intelligence operations during the war. The extent to which Livingston was involved in these activities is unknown but when Edward Rutledge wrote to Livingston in September of 1776 requesting he return to Philadelphia, he was “convinced that you [Livingston] would render your State more essential Services by attending in Congress than you can by riding about the Country in counteracting the Schemes of Tories.”[xiii] In response to a similar letter Jay explained to Rutledge “Governour Tryon has been very mischievous, and we find our hands full in counteracting and suppressing the conspiracies formed by him and his adherents.”[xiv] During this time Jay was also acting as a spymaster, most famously to Enoch Crosby. Crosby repeatedly enlisted in loyalist regiments then allowed himself to be captured in order to share his information with the patriots. He would then “escape” and return to New York City to begin the process again. Crosby was the basis for the lead character in James Fenimore Cooper’s The Spy and John Jay was one of Fenimore’s chief sources. It is possible that Livingston was involved in these intelligence gathering activities, alongside Jay, and that is what Rutledge was referring to when he asked Livingston to give up his riding about the country to return to Philadelphia.[xv]
In September of 1776 Robert Livingston was chosen, by the state government, to a committee charged with establishing a secure mail route between Fishkill, where the Committee of Safety was meeting and the army’s headquarters. The other member of the committee was Henry Wisner. The Committee hoped to receive daily updates on the movements of the British from General George Clinton and anyone else they could get to write to them.[xvi]
Shortly thereafter Livingston was chosen to join another military committee, this one to travel to Albany to consult with General Philip Schuyler on the defense of the state. Fears of a British invasion from Canada were growing in the state. The army that Richard Montgomery had led to the walls of Quebec the previous winter had fallen back into New York during the summer of 1776 with the British army following them. Ultimately the British army would give up on reaching any further south into New York after the Battle of Valcour Island in October of 1776. Other members of the committee to consult with Schuyler included; Abraham Ten Broeck, Evert Bancker, Jacob Cuyler, John Bleeker, John Taylor, James Duane, Robert Yates, Christopher Yates, John Ten Broeck, Volkert Veder and William Harper. The committee’s main task was laid out as;
“WHEREAS it is of the utmost importance to the safety of this State, and to the general cause of America, that the legislative authority of this State should make the most vigorous and decisive exertions for repelling the progress of the enemy’s arms, and for preserving the lives, liberty and property of the good people of this State, from falling a sacrifice to a tyrannical, merciless and savage enemy…RESOLVED that a committee be forthwith appointed to repair to the city of Albany, in order to cooperate with Major-General Schuyler on devising and carrying into execution all such measures as they shall deem most effectual for repelling the invasion of the enemy’s army on the northern and western frontiers of this state…”
The committee was also vested with the power to call out the militia of the state if necessary.[xvii]
Again in November of 1776 Livingston was chosen by the Committee of Safety to consult with the generals on military matters. He was sent to Peekskill and North Castle to talk to Clinton, Charles Lee and William Heath. His mission was to find answers to questions the Committee of Safety had on the movements of the British, what passes in the Hudson Highlands needed to be secured and how the river could be further blocked to prevent the British from using it. Heath recalled that “Mr. Livingston came from Congress to advise with our General on measures to obstruct the river”[xviii] Livingston’s report to the Convention about this meeting stated that the plan of chain and chevaux de frize “appeared to them to be extremely Practicable…” and that “both generals seemed strongly impressed with a sense of the Importance of that Work and determined to give every Assistance in their Power to perfect the same…”[xix]
During the spring and summer of 1777 Livingston was enormously concerned with the movement of the British army. He greatly feared an attack up the river or an assault from Canada. “I greatly fear that our Northern army will be but a weak barrier against the enemy, if they should think it proper to follow their blow, to which they may be induced by that very weakness.”[xx] To Alexander Hamilton he wrote; “You have heard of the Enemy’s little Excursion to Peeks[kill]; we wish it may not encourage them, to make a more serious Attempt…” He went on “are you equally well satisfied that they may not open their Campaign by sailing to the Northward?”[xxi] Livingston encouraged General Washington to send, at least, a detachment of the army toward New York City in the summer of 1777 to give the British second thoughts about launching an expedition up the river.
“might it not be worth while to alarm New York by sending down two or three thousand men who might possibly strike some bold stroke or at least oblidge the Enemy to retain a considerable part of their force at that place & proportionably weaken their army in the Jersies?”[xxii]
He frequently wrote to Washington’s headquarters expressing his concerns and could not have been anything but disappointed by the response he received. By late summer he was downright disagreeing with the answers that he was getting from headquarters especially from Alexander Hamilton. To Hamilton he wrote;
“I wish I Could believe as You do with respect to the Enemies Strenght, but in order to do this I must prefer loose Conjectures to the Greatest Variety of Concurring testimoneys- That prisoners may Endeavour to Deceive I think probable, but that a number of Men should agree to tell a Similar tale, & give like Answers to questions without knowing what those questions will be, I cannot believe…”[xxiii]
On August 10, 1777 Livingston wrote to Hamilton again, having received yet another dismissive reply from Washington’s aide-de-camp about his concerns for New York. Livingston again laid out the dangers facing the state, how embattled it already was; “we have little more than 4 Counties remaining out of the 14 we once possessed.” He ended the letter with an admonishment to Hamilton to listen to others
“I know Sir, that people at a distance see things different from those on the Spot, & that what I have alleged may be attributed to ill founded apprehensions; all I can say is that I heartily wish the event may not justify them…I think it my duty to state things to you truly, that you may not be surprized if affairs should take a turn which we do not expect, especially as I see you have formed very fallacious Conjectures both of our Strength & of the Army.” [xxiv]
The British army made sure to repay Livingston for all of his work for the patriot side. In 1777 the British launched a three pronged attack to finally wrest control of the Hudson River from the Patriots and cut New England off like a gangrenous limb. General John Burgoyne designed a plan in which he would lead a large force of regulars, loyalist recruits and Native American warriors out of Canada, down the Champlain Valley, across Lake George and down the Hudson River to Albany. A second force under Barry St. Leger would travel south from further west in Canada and come at Albany from the west along the Mohawk River valley. General Howe would bring the British army in New York City north up the Hudson River to link up with the other two armies at Albany. The American Northern Army would be trapped and crushed and Washington would have little choice but to attack the British army where they would most likely be defeated or forced to retreat and watch the New England colonies crumble.
The British plan fell apart over the course of that summer for a number of reasons. First and foremost Howe decided to attack the American capital Philadelphia rather than support Burgoyne’s attack on the Hudson. European tradition held that if an enemy’s capital the war would be over. He was able to conquer Philadelphia later in the year but the American government had already set up shop in York, Pennsylvania and ultimately the attack led to no real advantage for the red coats. St. Leger’s attack was stopped at Fort Stanwix. Although the British and their allies did win the costly Battle of Oriskany and stop a force under General Nicholas Herkimer from relieving the fort, the prolonged siege of the fort ultimately failed and St. Leger was forced to retreat back to Canada when word of another relief column was on its way to the fort, this one led by Benedict Arnold.
Burgoyne’s own wing of the attack initially met with success. His army quickly rolled over the northern frontier forts including Ticonderoga. However the route was not nearly as easy going as Burgoyne had hoped for. What had appeared to be a quick march on a map turned into an agonizing slog through mile after mile of rough wilderness constantly impeded by downed trees and flooded tracks. Progress was slow and supplies began to run low, especially as General Schuyler’s plan of a scorched earth retreat, leaving nothing for the British to use, began to tell. A significant detachment from Burgoyne’s army was defeated at the Battle of Bennington and his native allies began to melt away. He met his fate at Saratoga where after two major battles he was found himself outnumbered and with no route to withdraw. He was forced to surrender.
General Henry Clinton, whom Howe had left in command of New York City, took a small force, up the Hudson River in an attempt to relieve some of the pressure on Burgoyne. The force was too small and too late to effect the outcome of the entire campaign, but it caused havoc in the valley. Clinton’s first challenge was to defeat the defenses planted in the river. The force sailed past the chevaux easily as they turned out to be an unreliable form of defense. The strong tides and currents of the Hudson River often caused the chevaux to shift on the river bottom and often left them sitting in water to deep to effect even the deepest drafted vessals. The fleet was still unable to sail past the chain, however. On the advice of local loyalists the British landed soldiers to the south of Fort Montgomery on the west side of the river and were able to take the undermanned fort from the land side. The British were then able to pull the chain out of the river.[xxv]
Clinton then dispatched a smaller segment of this force further north, under the command of General John Vaughan, to Kingston. Here the soldiers were put ashore and drove off a small defensive force after a brief exchange of gunfire. They then burned the town, which was the most recent meeting place for the New York government, essentially New York’s capital although, like the government in Philadelphia they simply moved elsewhere. Only a single building was said to have survived.
Some of the soldiers were then brought across to the east side of the river and landed in the area of Rhinebeck and began to march north. Another section were kept in the ships and paralleled the soldiers marching north, as they burned the homes of noted patriots. On October 18 they arrived at Clermont and burned Livingston’s home, the home of his mother and more than twenty outbuildings. As Colonel James Wilkinson reported to Washington later in the month; “The Incendiary Crew from N. York continue to ravage the Banks of the North River- The dwellings of Judge Livingston & Mrs Montgomery have, among many others, shared the fate of Esopus.”[xxvi]
The British occupied the land around Clermont, possibly as far North as Germantown, for several days. The ships of the expedition sailed far enough north to see the original manor house built by Robert the First Lord at the mouth of the Roeliff Jansen Kill. They retreated upon receiving definite word of Burgoyne’s surrender and returned to the city.
Livingston had been trapped on the east side of the river by the British advance and was unable to leave Kingston, on the west bank of the river, with the rest of the New York government. His family, mother, brother Edward, wife and sisters fled east to a house in Salisbury, Connecticut that belonged to Robert Livingston, Third Lord of the Manor who had himself fled to his iron works at Ancram. There is a story repeated in many books about the Livingstons of Margaret Beekman Livingston leading a hurried packing at Clermont where in the family’s slaves and the family members themselves were throwing goods from the house onto wagons, or burying immovable goods until the very last minute. It usually ends with the family cresting a hill to watch the smoke rise from their home as the British burned it. This story is highly unlikely as the smoke and perhaps even the fire from Kingston would have been visible from Clermont and the family would have had ample time to pack and head east even if they had not received a warning from Gouverneur Morris before the burning started. Margaret was certainly aware that her home and perhaps even her family would be targets of British aggression based on the activities of her late husband and her sons. As early as August of 1777 Margaret had written to her pastor of her plan to head to Salisbury in the event the British came up the river. Robert R. Livingston himself set out to join his family in Salisbury but turned back as the British Army approached.[xxvii]
Livingston chose to stay and join the militia for the duration of the occupation. Not much of the Manor militia was present during this time as they had been called out to serve at Saratoga. Somewhere between three and five hundred men from the manor had joined the Northern Army at Saratoga. It is not clear if Livingston joined up with what was left of his militia regiment or if he was referring to joining up with militia that General Israel Putnam brought with him when he finally arrived. In response to British incursion Putnam had brought what regulars and militia he had and lined the east bank of the river with soldiers. This probably looked impressive but left him unable to actually engage the British who were still on shore. However there was at least one skirmish between American and British forces as Vaughn reported one soldier shot through the head at Livingston Manor. On October 28, 1777 Livingston wrote to Pierre Van Cortlandt from Salisbury, Connecticut to explain his absence;
“I thought it improper when the enemy came up the river to leave this side of the water, which was unfortunate, in wanting both yours and the Governor’s direction. I therefore remained with the militia till the enemy left us. I am just now arrived at this place in order to inquire into the situation of my family, which has hitherto been left to fend for themselves. I am, therefore, unacquainted with the measures adopted by Council, but doubt not that they are such as are best suited to the present distressing occasion. The Council will, I flatter myself, pardon the liberty I take in offering a few hints which they may probably work up into something useful to the public. As the enemy have in their late ravages, affected to distinguish between their friends and those who are attached to our cause, the most affectual way to prevent future depredations, will be to make the burden fall where they did not intend it, and apprize the enemy of your resolutions for that purpose by flag or otherwise. In order to carry this into execution, an inquest should be taken in each county of the damage done, as well as of all our tory property; by which I mean the property of people who have either joined the enemy or refused to take the oath to us, by a general assessment, upon which the loss should be repaid.
Congress should be pressed to make retaliation; we have too long contented ourselves with unavailing threats. My sentiments on that subject are contained in the enclosed draft of a letter to Congress, which I do myself the honour to lay before the Council for their approbation. If they should think proper to adopt it, they will despatch it without delay to our Delegates; leaving it to their discretion to present it or not, after having felt the pulses of the members on the subject.
Would it not be proper, sir, to order some cannon to be cast at this furnace before it is out of blast, for the defence of the river, in order that there may be no delay in fortifying in the winter? It being clear to me that your only security next summer, will be to throw up works as soon as possible above Fort Montgomery; for I have no great hopes of retaking it, considering how defensible it may be made, and the number of troops the enemy can spare to garrison it.”[xxviii]
This is by far the most emotional letter that the Chancellor wrote during the war, motivated not only by the loss of his home but by the danger his family was placed in during the attack on the river. His anger, if not rage, can be seen in the lines where he suggests making those unaffected by Vaughan’s attack pay for the damage, which goes against his usual stance of leaving private property alone if at all possible. It also shows in his demand that the state push Congress for a retaliatory attack on the British. And yet by the end of the letter Livingston was thinking with his head and was pushing for the procurement of more cannon to refortify the river in preparation for renewed attacks should they come in the spring.
In the following year Livingston would focus most of his anger at the burning of his property on General Israel Putnam. He simply felt that Putnam had not done enough to stop the British advance on the river either through incompetence or lack of motivation. Livingston attempted to have Putnam removed from the army. He wrote to Washington of Putnam’s age and lack of drive.
“Your Excellency is not ignorant of the extent of Genl Putnams capacity, & diligence, & how well soever these may qualify him for the management of this work & most important command- the prejudices to which his imprudent Lenity to the disaffected, & too great intercourse with the enemy have given rise have greatly injured his influence-How far the loss of fort Montgomery and the subsequent ravages of the enemy are to be imputed to him, I will not venture to say, as this will necessarily be determined by a court of inquiry whose determinations I would not anticipate-Unfortunately for him the current of popular opinion in this, & the neighboring States, & as far as I can learn in the troops under his command, runs strongly against him. For my own part I respect his bravery, & former services, & sincerely lament that his patriotizm, will not suffer him to take that repose to which his advanced age & past services, justly entitle him. Your Excellency sees the necessity of spirit & activity in this department, of an officer who in a fertile genius can find resources against the multiplied wants of this situation.”[xxix]
Putnam was removed from his command in March of 1778 and replaced with General Alexander McDougal. Washington wrote to Livingston on March 12,1778:
“It has not been an easy matter to find a just pretence for removing an Officer from his command, where his misconduct rather appears to result from want of Capacity, than from any real intention of doing wrong…Proper measures are taking to carry on the enquiry into the loss of Fort Montgomery, agreeable to the direction of Congress, and it is more than probable, from what I have heard, that the issue of the enquiry will afford just grounds for the removal of Genl P–; but whether it does or not, the prejudices of all Ranks in that quarter against him are so great, that it would be impolitic to suffer him to return.”[xxx]
Putnam faced a court of inquiry but had already lost the support of the army and Washington. On April 10, 1778 Livingston wrote to Washington again;
“I am happy to find that an inquiry into the loss of the Fort has commenced, which, tho the objects of it are not so extensive as the publick censures (they comprehending the loss of the ships & the subsequent destruction of the country) yet will I believe be sufficient to discover at least the incapacity of Genl Putnam- Which however we may feel for the man who offends through ignorance is sufficient to justify the removal of any Officer upon whose abilities the lives of men & the freedom of a country may rest. In a republican government no room is left for those prejudices and & partialities which prevail in monarchies…Not having shaken off with the old government the prejudices we imbibed under it, we continue in command peace officers & dowager Genls who bring the army into contempt & render the most promising schemes abortive.”[xxxi]
Putnam was found not guilty but was none the less was sent back to Connecticut to superintend the raising of levies. Though he would eventually return to the main army, he was never again granted independent command. Officially the fall of the Highland forts was blamed on an insufficient number of men to defend them and not by any wrong doing by Putnam. In 1779 Putnam suffered a stroke that permanently ended his military career.
In the immediate aftermath of the destruction of his home, Livingston was understandably angry and depressed. William Smith, a loyalist on a form of parole, staying with Peter R. Livingston at the Hermitage on the Manor, attended dinner with Livingston and Israel Putnam shortly after the burning. He recorded that Livingston lost his temper and came to the conclusion that Livingston would take his anger out on the tenants. Instead Livingston briefly considered selling his Clermont land before thinking better of it and deciding to keep the land in the family. At the same time his ever resilient mother returned from Salisbury to the burned out remnants of her home. She began to rebuild almost immediately. She pestered Governor George Clinton into releasing several manor craftsmen from their militia responsibilities so that they could work on rebuilding Clermont.[xxxii]
Within months Livingston’s rage had passed. He offered 5,000 acres that he owned outside of Kingston to the people of the city to rebuild on. Generous as this offer was it was also incredibly shrewd in the same way his great grandfather’s deal to bring the Palatines to New York had been. While the Chancellor was giving away some land to settle on it people would have to cut roads and make other improvements, increasing the value of the land he still owned. At Christmas Dinner of 1777 at Peter R. Livingston’s house conversation turned toward the war. Mary Stevens Livingston flew into rage about Governor William Tryon saying that he should be hung. Livingston himself argued against retaliatory burnings of loyalist houses. He did however believe in quick hangings for loyalists caught in anti-American activities, to punish the guilty while avoiding the mass defections to the crown that blanket reprisals against suspected Tories would have brought about.
[i] Journals of the Continental Congress Volume III p 487.
[ii] “From George Washington to John Hancock, 14 July 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0218. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 5, 16 June 1776 – 12 August 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993, pp. 304–309.]
[iii] Diamont, Lincoln S. Defending the Hudson p 11
[iv]“To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 9 August 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0487. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 5, 16 June 1776 – 12 August 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993, pp. 649–651.]
[v] “From George Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 20 October 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0454. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 6, 13 August 1776 – 20 October 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase and Frank E. Grizzard, Jr. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1994, pp. 594–595.]
[vi] “From George Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 29 June 1780,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-02301
[vii] Journals of the Continental Congress Vol III p280-281.
[viii] “To George Washington from a Secret Committee of the New York Convention, 17 July 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0265. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 5, 16 June 1776 – 12 August 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993, pp. 361–362.]
[ix]“To George Washington from a Secret Committee of the New York Convention, 18 July 1776,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-05-02-0276. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 5, 16 June 1776 – 12 August 1776, ed. Philander D. Chase. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1993, pp. 377–378.] This letter is signed by four of the same members as the day before but William Paulding has been replaced by John Jay.
[x] Ruttenber, Obstructions 74.
[xi] Ruttenber, E.M. Obstructions to the Navigation of Hudson’s River J. Munsell, Albany 1860, p 21-22, 26.
[xii] Diamont, Lincoln S. Defending the Hudson in the American Revolution Purple Mountain Press, New York 2004, p 40; Ruttenber, Obstructions p 69, 73.
[xiii] Edward Rutledge to Robert R. Livingston October 2, 1776 LDC Volume 2 p. 294
[xiv] John Jay to Edward Rutledge October 11, 1776 LDC volume 2 p 298
[xv] Stahr John Jay p70-72
[xvi] Henry Wisner, William Allison and Robert R. Livingston to George Clinton 17 September 1776 Public Papers of George Clinton Volume 1 p 354-355
[xvii] Resolution of the Committee of Safety October 19, 1776 Public Papers of George Clinton Volume I p 387.
[xviii] John McKesson to George Clinton 26 November 1776 Public Papers of George Clinton Volume I p 433; Wilson, Rufus Rockwell Heath’s Memoirs of the American War A. Wessels Company, New York 1904 p 104
[xix] Ruttenber Obstructions p 105.
[xx] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 16 July 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-10-02-0293. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 10, 11 June 1777 – 18 August 1777, ed. Frank E. Grizzard, Jr. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000, pp. 297–298.]
[xxi] “To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 29 March 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0117 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 1, 1768-1778, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, pp. 215-216.
[xxii] “To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 7 June 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0182. [Original source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 1, 1768–1778, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, pp. 267–268.]
[xxiii] “To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 2 August 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0241 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. 1, 1768-1778, ed. Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, pp.302-304.
[xxiv] “To Alexander Hamilton from Robert R. Livingston, 10 August 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-01-02-0250 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Source: The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, vol. , 1768-1778, ed Harold C. Syrett. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, pp310-312.
[xxv] Diamont, Lincoln S. Defending the Hudson p 29
[xxvi] “To George Washington from Lieutenant Colonel James Wilkinson, 24 October 1777,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-11-02-0618. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 11, 19 August 1777 – 25 October 1777, ed. Philander D. Chase and Edward G. Lengel. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001, p. 604.]
[xxvii] Sabine, William H.W., Historical Memoirs From 16 March 1763 to 25 July 1778 of William Smith Arno Press, New York 1969 p. 237, Margaret Beekman Livingston to Westerlo, August 1777 in the collection of Wilderstein.
[xxviii] Robert R. Livingston to Pierre Van Cortlandt Correspondence of the Provincial Congress… Vol II p 352.
[xxix] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 14 January 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives, version of January 18, 2019, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-13-02-0195. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 13, 26 December 1777 – 28 February 1778, ed. Edward G. Lengel. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003, pp. 234–237.]
[xxx] “From George Washington to Robert R. Livingston, 12 March 1778” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washin gton/03-14-02-0128 [last update: 2016-03-28]) Source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 14, 1 March 1778- 30 April 1778 ed. David R Hoth. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004, pp 163-164
[xxxi] “To George Washington from Robert R. Livingston, 10 April 1778,” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-14-02-0431 [last update:2016-03-28]) ]) Source: The Papers of George Washington, Revolutionary War Series, vol. 14, 1 March 1778- 30 April 1778 ed. David R Hoth. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004, pp 464-466
[xxxii] Sabine, Historical Memoirs p. 240.